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What does it mean for a data subject to make
their personal data ‘manifestly public’? An
analysis of GDPR Article 9(2)(e)
Edward S. Dove* and Jiahong Chen†
Introduction
Under European data protection law, certain kinds of
personal data are considered ‘special’—in other words,
sensitive—and therefore deserving of even greater legal
protection than that afforded to non-special (regular)
personal data. As Recital 51 of the EU’s General Data
Protection Regulation (GDPR)1 states, a high level of
protection for sensitive data is regarded as necessary
since they ‘are, by their nature, particularly sensitive in
relation to fundamental rights and freedoms [and thus]
merit specific protection as the context of their process-
ing could create significant risks to the fundamental
rights and freedoms’.2 Special categories of personal
data are those revealing racial or ethnic origin, political
opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, or trade
union membership; it also covers data concerning
health and data concerning a natural person’s sex life or
sexual orientation; and it covers the processing of ge-
netic data or biometric data for the purpose of uniquely
identifying a natural person.3 Whereas with non-special
Key points
 This article investigates an under-discussed and
potentially significant provision in the EU
General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR),
namely Article 9(2)(e), which permits processing
of special category personal data if the ‘process-
ing relates to personal data which are manifestly
made public by the data subject’.
 This provision may be of increasing interest to
data controllers in a variety of cloud-based, inter-
net-related, and/or social media contexts. We
specifically consider the application of this provi-
sion in the context of genetic data and open data
sharing (ie data that can be freely used, re-used,
and redistributed by anyone), illustrating this by
way of several cases of initiatives that seek to
share genetic data. We query whether by upload-
ing one’s own genetic data onto the internet, a
person has made their data ‘manifestly public’
within the meaning of the GDPR.
 Our response to this query is that in general, the
answer should be no, but it remains possible. We
argue that Article 9(2)(e) must be construed nar-
rowly; outside of clearly defined contexts, it
would be legally inappropriate to invoke and rely
upon this manifestly public self-disclosure excep-
tion in data protection law. Our narrow
interpretation of the provision aligns with the
limited guidance made available from data pro-
tection authorities. As part of this argument, we
propose a legal test that must be satisfied before
Article 9(2)(e) may be lawfully invoked, and
which is grounded in the intent of the data
subject.
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1 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard
to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such
data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC, OJ 2016 L 119/1 (General Data
Protection Regulation) [hereinafter, GDPR].
2 For a thorough analysis of the concepts of the sensitive data and health
data in EU data protection law, see Paul Quinn and Gianclaudio
Malgieri, ‘The Difficulty of Defining Sensitive Data—The Concept of
Sensitive Data in the EU Data Protection Framework’ (2020) <https://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id¼3713134> accessed 4
February 2021.
3 Art 9(1) GDPR.
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(regular) personal data, processing is lawful only where
there is a legal basis, with special categories of data,
processing is generally prohibited; it will only be permit-
ted if the person processing the data has a legal basis
and meets a special category condition (ie an exception
to the rule against processing such data). In other
words, processing ‘special categories’ of personal data
requires two conditions:
1. the processing must have a legal basis, ie one of the
six legal bases outlined in Article 6(1) of the EU’s
General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), and
2. it must fall within at least one of the 10 exceptions
specified in Article 9(2) of the GDPR.
Since the days of the (now-superseded) EU’s Data
Protection Directive 95/46/EC (DPD),4 a provision has
been available to data controllers wanting to process
special categories of data. This provision was found in
the special category data section of the DPD—Article
8(2)(e)—and finds itself in the equivalent section of the
GDPR—at Article 9(2)(e). It has been phrased identi-
cally in both statutes: ‘Paragraph 1 [the prohibition of
processing special category personal data] shall not ap-
ply if one of the following applies: [. . .] processing
relates to personal data which are manifestly made pub-
lic by the data subject’. In both statutes, the meaning of
the phrase ‘manifestly made public by the data subject’
is not defined. And, interestingly, whereas several of the
exceptions that are provided in Article 9(2)—such as
the possibility to process special category data for rea-
sons of ‘scientific research’, ‘public health’, and ‘sub-
stantial public interest’—are defined in terms of a
‘purpose’, Article 9(2)(e) makes no reference to the pur-
poses of the data controller. What makes this provision
even more special is the fact that EU data protection law
does not generally make a substantial distinction be-
tween personal data in a private space and in a public
one.5 Unlike in jurisdictions where the ‘third-party doc-
trine’ applies,6 disclosing one’s own personal data pub-
licly in the EU does not automatically render the data
no longer protected. The exemption therefore raises sev-
eral immediate questions regarding an interpretative
approach that would ensure consistency with the overall
objectives of EU data protection law.
Looking to guidance from European regulatory au-
thorities as to the meaning of this phrase, one is struck
by the relative paucity of information. There is little
guidance from national data protection authorities
(DPAs) or the European Data Protection Board (EDPB)
on Article 9(2)(e); nor does there seem to be much
precedent for its invocation. Consequently, it may be
seen as an untested pathway for controllers to process
special category personal data without having to fulfil
onerous obligations associated with other exceptions
under Article 9(2). Moreover, though a large part of the
limited guidance available recommends that the phrase
‘manifestly made public by the data subject’ should be
construed narrowly—and indeed, given that Article
9(1) prohibits processing special category data unless an
exemption applies under Article 9(2), a narrow inter-
pretation should be applied to all of the listed exemp-
tions7—because it is largely untested in law, its scope
remains uncharted and thus this position of narrow in-
terpretation may not be strictly followed by data con-
trollers. And, given the challenges associated with
securing other exceptions under Article 9(2), such as ex-
plicit consent in some data processing activities (eg
resources for obtaining data subject consent for large-
scale processing activities, concern about implications
of consent withdrawal by the data subject), ‘manifestly
made public by the data subject’ may be seen as a
lighter-touch exception for data controllers to pursue,
in contexts such as the data subject publishing their
data in the mass media or putting them on online social
networks, the latter of which is a vastly growing area of
communication and commerce—not to mention data
processing.8 This may be especially apparent in the con-
text of large-scale genomic research activities, whereby
research organizations seek to collect biological samples
from thousands of participants, sequence them for ge-
netic analysis, ‘interpret’ them, and in turn generate hy-
potheses, research breakthroughs, effective treatments,
and ideally, innovative treatments. Moreover, Article
4 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24
October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the process-
ing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, OJ 1995 L
281/31 [hereinafter, Data Protection Directive].
5 Lilian Edwards, ‘Privacy, Security and Data Protection in Smart Cities: A
Critical EU Law Perspective’ (2016) 2(1) European Data Protection Law
Review 28.
6 Eunice Park, ‘Objects, Places and Cyber-Spaces Post-Carpenter:
Extending the Third-Party Doctrine beyond CSLI: A Consideration of
IoT and DNA’ (2019) 21 Yale Journal of Law and Technology 1.
7 Ludmila Georgieva and Christopher Kuner, ‘Article 9. Processing of
Special Categories of Personal Data’, in Christopher Kuner, Lee Bygrave
and Christopher Docksey (eds), The EU General Data Protection
Regulation (GDPR): A Commentary (OUP 2020) 375 (‘The list of excep-
tions is exhaustive and all of them are to be interpreted restrictively’).
8 Video surveillance alone is unlikely to fulfil the conditions of art 9(2)(e),
as we elaborate later in this article. We note that the European Data
Protection Board has stated that ‘. . .data controllers processing [special
categories of personal] data in the context of video surveillance cannot
rely on Article 9 (2) (e), which allows processing that relates to personal
data that are manifestly made public by the data subject. The mere fact of
entering into the range of the camera does not imply that the data subject
intends to make public special categories of data relating to him or her’.
See European Data Protection Board, Guidelines 3/2019 on Processing of
Personal Data through Video Devices (2019) para 69.
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9(2)(e) may be seen as an especially attractive option in
the context of open data sharing, ie for those research
endeavours that seek to make data, personal or other-
wise, openly available to people around the world with-
out restriction. If data subjects upload their genetic data
onto the internet, it might be the case that researchers
(and others) could make use of such data without the
data subject’s explicit consent as per Article 9(2)(a). In
our view, the heightened sensitivity of uploading genetic
data, given that these data are particularly prone to re-
identification and contain identifying information
about genetic relatives,9 makes the applicability of
Article 9(2)(e) of more acute current concern and, as
we will argue in this article, explains why Article 9(2)(e)
should be read restrictively in such novel contexts.
Genomic research organizations may be reluctant to
rely on Article 9(2)(e) to process genetic data and data
concerning health, though, in the absence of any clear
regulatory guidance or precedent. And given the paucity
of such guidance and precedent, we lack a good under-
standing of what this provision means. We do not know
what the permitted role of intermediaries (e.g. internet
service providers, search engines, social media plat-
forms) is, if any, in the process of making an individu-
al’s data manifestly public; nor do we know the
conditions under which it is necessary to satisfy Article
9(2)(e) as distinct from those needed to satisfy explicit
consent under Article 9(2)(a) or scientific research un-
der Article 9(2)(j)—other exceptions that are relevant
in the context of large-scale genomic research activities.
Thus, the aim of this article is to chart the contours
of Article 9(2)(e) and specifically to consider its applica-
tion in the context of genetic data and open data shar-
ing.10 We argue that, even by the strict standards of
Article 9(2) interpretation, Article 9(2)(e) must be con-
strued narrowly; outside of clearly defined contexts, it
would be legally inappropriate to invoke this exception.
Our narrow interpretation aligns with the limited—and
rather generic—guidance made available from DPAs. As
part of this argument, we propose a legal test that must
be satisfied before Article 9(2)(e) may be lawfully in-
voked, grounded in the intent of the data subject.
Recognizing that grounding the test in the intent of the
data subject may create some risk in undermining the
certainty or workability of the exemption for the data
controller, we consider that this test does not amount to
an ‘absolute’ approach. Instead, what is required is ob-
jective evidence based on that which the data controller
may reasonably establish to be such an intent.
In what follows, in ‘The case of genetic data: which
special category exception?’ section, we discuss several
case studies of international large-scale genomic re-
search activities. Using these case studies for subsequent
analysis, we query whether by uploading one’s own ge-
netic data onto the internet, a person has made their
data ‘manifestly public’ within the meaning of Article
9(2)(e). In the ‘Explicit consent and public self-
disclosure as voluntary grounds: why does it matter?’
section, we elaborate in depth the significance of ascer-
taining the appropriate exemption under Article 9(2),
explaining why relying on different conditions may lead
to different levels of protection for data subjects. As part
of this, we highlight the risks of using public availability
(Article 9(2)(e)) as a way around certain data controller
duties. With such a risk in mind, in ‘The curious case of
‘manifest’ self-disclosure in data protection law’ section,
we further consider various interpretations of Article
9(2)(e) and apply it to the context of the voluntarily
permissive mechanisms under the GDPR, arguing that
the lines between (explicit) consent and public disclo-
sure are sometimes unclear; though they both represent
voluntary permissions of using (sensitive) personal
data, the legal and practical consequences are starkly
different. In ‘A legal test for Article 9(2)(e)’ section, we
consider the role of intermediaries in the process of
making an individual’s data manifestly public, and the
conditions under which it is necessary to satisfy Article
9(2)(e) as distinct from those needed to satisfy explicit
consent under Article 9(2)(a). We also propose a legal
test that must be satisfied before Article 9(2)(e) may be
lawfully invoked, grounded in the intent of the data
subject; as part of this test, we unpack the individual ele-
ments of the provisions, including the meaning of the
phrase ‘by the data subject’. Finally, we conclude with
parting thoughts about the scope and suitability of
Article 9(2)(e) as a condition generally in data protec-
tion law, and specifically in the context of genetic
research.
We begin our assessment by looking at several ge-
netic research and data-sharing initiatives, posing the
question: which special category exception under Article
9 Thomas Finnegan and Alison Hall, Identification and Genomic Data
(PHG Foundation 2017) <https://www.phgfoundation.org/documents/
PHGF-Identification-and-genomic-data.pdf> accessed 4 February 2021.
10 Another emerging scenario in the context of art 9(2)(e) is carrying out
research on publicly available social media data, such as those on Twitter,
TikTok, Instagram, or Facebook. While we do not explore this context in
the article, our analysis is intended to be applicable across domains.
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9(2) may be appropriate to process participants’ genetic
data?
The case of genetic data: which special
category exception?
As mentioned in the previous section, Article 9(2)(e)
may be seen to apply in different contexts, such as pub-
lishing data in the mass media or putting them on on-
line social media platforms; in our view, one of the
more interesting and novel (that is, largely untested)
contexts where this provision might apply is large-scale
genomic research activities that promote open sharing
of such data. In this section, we introduce several case
studies of initiatives (ie platforms) that seek to share ge-
netic data in different ways, on a scale of semi-open to
fully open: GenomeConnect, Personal Genome Project,
and openSNP.
GenomeConnect
GenomeConnect is an American-based not-for-profit
online registry designed by the Clinical Genome
Resource (ClinGen, a National Institutes of Health-
funded resource) for people who are interested in
sharing ‘de-identified’ genetic and health information
to improve understanding of genetics and health.11
Participants who register are also able to connect with
other individuals and families through
GenomeConnect’s participant matching feature.
Participants can learn about other research opportuni-
ties and receive updates about their genetic testing
results. The registry is open to anyone who has had ge-
netic testing, is considering testing, or has a family
member that has had testing regardless of test results or
diagnosis. Interestingly, it appears that participants can
only consent to all uses of the data outlined by
GenomeConnect; they cannot consent only to some
aspects of the service.
The process works whereby participants register on-
line, consent to participate and share their health his-
tory by completing an online survey, and then upload a
copy of their genetic resting report(s) to their
GenomeConnect account. GenomeConnect welcomes
participants from any country in the world, provided
they are able to read and understand English; however,
they do not process data from participants in the EU/
EEA or UK due to the GDPR.12
In the GenomeConnect Participant Matching feature,
the uploaded genetic testing reports are used to create a
searchable gene list. Once a participant uploads their re-
port, GenomeConnect’s team of genetic counsellors re-
view the report and any genes listed are added to the
searchable gene list.
GenomeConnect shares the de-identified health and
genomic data with approved users and databases. In
other words, the personal data on the GenomeConnect
database itself remain private and only ClinGen staff
can access it. From this, we can gather that while
GenomeConnect does not include participants in the
EU/EEA or UK as it seeks to avoid the long-arm reach
of the GDPR, even if, hypothetically speaking, the
GDPR were to apply, GenomeConnect would likely ar-
gue that the legal basis for processing personal data of
participants is consent, albeit arguably not to the GDPR
standard (it would have to demonstrate that this con-
sent is freely given), and the permitted exception to pro-
cess their genetic and health data is explicit consent.
Given data are uploaded into a semi-open (or semi-
closed, depending on one’s perspective) database and
made available only to approved users in a de-identified
format, as we will see, it is difficult to see how Article
9(2)(e) could be confidently relied upon.
Personal Genome Project
The Personal Genome Project (PGP) is a global project
initiated in 2005, with the aim of creating and sharing
public genome, health, and phenotypic trait data.13 The
PGP recruits people who are expressly willing to pub-
licly share their personal data. Thus, in contrast to
GenomeConnect, which shares only de-identified data
with approved external researchers (and others), PGP
aims to have all personal data be freely available to ev-
eryone, in line with the ethos of open data and open sci-
ence. To date, PGP has projects in the USA, Canada,
UK, Austria, and China.
Uniquely, the risks of participant re-identification
are addressed up front, as an integral part of the consent
and enrolment process. Participants are informed that
neither anonymity nor confidentiality of their identities
or their data can be guaranteed. To qualify for enrol-
ment, prospective participants must complete an online
exam to demonstrate their comprehension of the risks
11 GenomeConnect, available at <https://www.genomeconnect.org/>
accessed 4 February 2021.
12 GenomeConnect, ‘Questions from Participants’ <https://www.clinicalge
nome.org/genomeconnect/for-patients-genomeconnect/faq/questions-
from-participants/> accessed 4 February 2021.
13 Personal Genome Project <https://www.personalgenomes.org/gb>
accessed 4 February 2021.
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and protocols associated with being a member of the
PGP. In the UK project, for example, participants must
also be a UK citizen or permanent resident, at least 21
years of age, and capable of giving consent.14
The information sheet and consent form for PGP-
UK15 specifies that University College London (UCL) is
the sponsor of PGP-UK and will keep identifiable infor-
mation about participants for five years until 2028, after
the study finishes in 2023. Though not explicitly stated,
it would seem that the GDPR legal basis and special cat-
egory exception for processing health and genetic data
being relied upon is (explicit) consent, as indicated in
the information sheet, though certain phrasing of lan-
guage gives some doubt as to the ‘freely given’ nature of
the consent:
By signing this consent form, you authorize the PGP-UK to
publish your specimen analysis data and other personal in-
formation you have submitted to the PGP-UK. This means
that the PGP-UK may publish this data and information
without legal restriction and without your being asked to
provide any additional consent. The PGP-UK will publish
the data and information on a publicly accessible website
and database. It may also publish the data and information
in other formats and/or media. Your ability to withdraw
your consent once the PGP-UK has published all or some
of this data and information is limited and is described in
Article X of this consent form. There may be risks to you
associated with the publication of this data and informa-
tion. Those risks are described in Article X of this consent
form.
[. . .]
By signing this consent form, you authorize the PGP-UK to
distribute to others, in a manner consistent with the condi-
tions described above, the cell lines created from your tis-
sues without further notice to you and without the PGP-
UK obtaining any additional consent from you. Your abil-
ity to withdraw from the portion of this study that involves
the distribution of your cell lines is limited once your cells
lines have been created and distributed and is described in
Article X of this consent form. There may be risks to you
associated with the creation and distribution of your cell
lines. Those risks are described in Article VI of this consent
form.16
The form itself does not explicitly state the legal basis
for processing personal data and such information
could not be located on the website in a privacy notice
(informational requirements under Article 13 GDPR).
This said, there is some ambiguity with the phrase, ‘By
signing this consent form, you authorize the PGP-UK
to publish your specimen analysis data and other per-
sonal information you have submitted to the PGP-UK’,
potentially signalling potential manifest self-disclosure
by the participant and reliance on Article 9(2)(e) as the
permitted exception to lawfully process genetic and
health data.
openSNP
openSNP is a crowd-funded initiative that enables cus-
tomers of direct-to-customer (DTC) genetic tests (such
as those from the company 23andMe) to publish online
their test results, find other people with similar genetic
variations, learn more about their results by getting the
latest primary literature on their variations, and help
scientists find new associations.17 This is done by having
participants upload their raw genotype data that have
been downloaded from their DTC test provider. As with
GenomeConnect and PGP, participants sign up to par-
ticipate by registering online. Unlike the other two proj-
ects, however, openSNP offers a relatively light-touch
consent form; moreover, they appear to rely on a form
of manifest self-disclosure akin to Article 9(2)(e) for
processing special category personal data. Indeed, be-
cause the purpose of the processing is not made clear,
we have some doubt that consent would be the legal ba-
sis upon which they rely. openSNP asks participants to
recognize ‘. . .that you have understood the possible
risks and side-effects that can occur by making your ge-
netical [sic] and medical information available on this
platform’, that ‘. . .all data you upload to openSNP will
be freely available online (well, except your mail-address
and password) under a Creative Commons Zero li-
cense’, and that ‘There is zero privacy anyway, get over
it’.18 Likewise, in the FAQ section of the website, in re-
sponse to the question, ‘How open is my data?’, the re-
ply is: ‘Completely open: Everyone can see everything
you enter or upload (except your private messages and
your password, of course). We warn every user twice
about this: Once during the user-creation and once be-
fore the genotyping-file-upload’.19
14 PGP-UK Enrolment Process and Requirements <https://www.personalge
nomes.org.uk/volunteer/> accessed 4 February 2021.
15 Informed Consent for Enrolment in the PGP-UK, UCL Research Ethics




17 openSNP <https://www.opensnp.org/> accessed 4 February 2021.
18 openSNP, ‘Signup’ <https://www.opensnp.org/signup> accessed 4
February 2021.
19 openSNP, ‘FAQ’ <https://www.opensnp.org/faq> accessed 4 February
2021.
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Summarizing the three platforms
In sum, then, though it is not made explicitly clear, at
least some of these three platforms appear to rely on a
form of Article 9(2)(e) as the permitted exception to
process health and genetic data. For PGP and openSNP,
the data are made public. Downstream researchers (and
others) are unable to contact participants for consent.
These platforms might rely on the scientific research ex-
ception, Article 9(2)(j) (discussed below), but they
could, in principle, equally rely on Article 9(2)(e): par-
ticipant–data subjects have agreed to make their data
public and have been informed that their data are being
made public. However, this is not satisfyingly clear to
us, and thus, the legal question remains: by uploading
one’s own genomic data onto the internet, on what ba-
sis can someone process their data? In other words,
what is the specific exception under Article 9(2) to pro-
cess the data? And, once the data are published on the
platform, what is the specific exception under Article
9(2) for downstream users to perform subsequent data
processing for their own purposes? Must the platform
and others (ie researchers from other organizations), in
order to utilize such data, obtain the data subject’s ex-
plicit consent as per Article 9(2)(a), including every
time they use the data, or can they rely on another ex-
ception, such as that the processing is for scientific re-
search purposes as per Article 9(2)(j) and in accordance
with Article 89(1), or indeed that the data have been
manifestly made public as per Article 9(2)(e) and thus
the data can be used repeatedly and in some sense, in-
definitely and by anyone?
These questions are all the more important because
were consent to be the lawful basis under Article 6(1)
and the permitted exception under Article 9(2), if a par-
ticipant subsequently decided to withdraw their consent
for data processing, in principle (though not without
some concern about fairness), a data controller may
then seek to ‘switch’ to an alternative legal basis and
permitted exception,20 such as legitimate interests and
scientific research, or indeed rely on the basis that the
data subject, by uploading their genetic data to the in-
ternet, has manifestly made it public. The choice of such
a legal basis and permitted exception will determine the
legal duties imposed on the data controller as well as the
safeguards available to the data subject, which we now
proceed to analyse in detail in the next section.
Explicit consent and public self-
disclosure as voluntary grounds: why
does it matter?
To understand why it is of practical significance for an
open genome platform to choose the appropriate ex-
emption under Article 9(2) and to make it explicit and
clear to both the data subject and downstream data
users, one first needs to analyse the legal consequences
resulting from such a choice. Specifically, this concerns
the legal effects of a data subject’s action when they sign
up for an open genome programme and upload their
genomic data. As will be shown below, relying on the
data subject’s manifestly public self-disclosure does not
mean the data controller can avoid their ongoing legal
and ethical responsibilities. Yet, the selection between
explicit consent, scientific research, and manifestly pub-
lic self-disclosure would still make a significant differ-
ence on a range of matters. We focus in particular on
contrasting Article 9(2)(a) with 9(2)(e).
First, consent as a valid legal basis under Article
6(1)—and as a permitted exception under Article
9(2)—is subject to a wider range of further conditions,
mainly set out in Articles 7 and 8. One obvious differ-
ence is that while the data subject has ‘the right to with-
draw his or her consent at any time’,21 such a right does
not apply when a legal basis other than consent is in-
voked under Article 6(1) and another permitted excep-
tion is invoked under Article 9(2). Consequently, the
data controller would not have to inform the data sub-
ject of this right. This means that if the data subject is
deemed to have manifestly made their data public, they
will not be able to restrict downstream uses of such data
as one would by withdrawing their consent. This does
not mean that once data are in the public domain, the
data subject no longer has any ability to control their
use. Conceivably, a data subject on certain platforms
can ‘take down’ the data by removing them from the
platform; this, of course, is easier to do in a digital con-
text than an analogue one, but it does not guarantee
that further processing will no longer take place. It is ar-
guable that once a data subject has removed their
20 See art 17(1)(b) GDPR. However, it should be noted that such a switch
to an alternative legal basis must be communicated to the data subject
and cannot be exploited to retrospectively remedy flawed consent. See
Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Guidelines on Consent under
Regulation 2016/679 (WP259 rev.01, 2018), 22–23 <https://ec.europa.eu/
newsroom/article29/document.cfm?doc_id¼51030> accessed 4 February
2021. There are also concerns that it may be inherently unfair to tell peo-
ple they have a choice as to whether to consent to have their data
processed, but then continue the data processing after they withdraw
their consent. On this point, see Information Commissioner’s Office
(UK), ‘How should we obtain, record and manage consent?’ <https://
ico.org.uk/for-organisations/guide-to-data-protection/guide-to-the-gen
eral-data-protection-regulation-gdpr/consent/how-should-we-obtain-re
cord-and-manage-consent/> accessed 4 February 2021.
21 Art 7(3) GDPR.
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genomic data from the open platform—in other words,
by making them no longer publicly available—any fu-
ture use of such data based on Article 9(2)(e) should
cease to take place, assuming users are put ‘on notice’
about this, in accordance with the lawfulness, fairness,
and transparency principle under Article 5(1)(a).
However, this is not clearly provided for by the GDPR.
Secondly, certain data subject rights may or may not
be relevant depending on the chosen Article 9(2) excep-
tion. Closely related to the withdrawal of consent as dis-
cussed above is the right to erasure, or sometimes more
commonly known as the right to be forgotten. Once the
data subject has withdrawn their consent for the proc-
essing of data, Article 15(1) would be triggered, whereby
the data subject may request ‘the erasure of personal
data concerning him or her without undue delay’.22 In
addition, where the personal data concerned are shared
with others, the data controller should at the same time
‘take reasonable steps, including technical measures, to
inform controllers which are processing the personal
data’. In the case of an open genomic data-sharing plat-
form, this means that if the data subject withdraws their
consent and asks their data to be removed, the platform
must not only delete the data from their platform, but
also endeavour to communicate that request to those
who have downloaded the dataset as long as this is tech-
nically and financially feasible. It should, however, be
noted that, for scientific research purposes, the data
controller may refuse the right to erasure request if the
right ‘is likely to render impossible or seriously impair
the achievement of the objectives of that processing’.23
In contrast, if the genomic data are being processed
on the basis of Article 9(2)(e), it would be much more
difficult for the data subject to establish and exercise the
right to erasure, although not entirely impossible. Apart
from withdrawal of consent, another ground on which
the right to erasure can be exercised is the data subject’s
objection to the processing.24 Resorting to the right to
object, however, faces two major legal hurdles in the
case of open genomic data sharing. First, the data sub-
ject’s objection does not guarantee the erasure of the
personal data concerned. Rather, the data controller
would be required to perform a balancing test, and may
refuse to stop processing or to delete the data if ‘the
controller demonstrates compelling legitimate grounds
for the processing which override the interests, rights,
and freedoms of the data subject’.25 This point has been
made clear in the Court of Justice of the European
Union (CJEU)’s GC & others v CNIL and Google deci-
sion in a search engine setting.26 It is certainly arguable
that where the data subject has taken down their geno-
mic data from the platform, there would be no ‘compel-
ling legitimate grounds’ for further processing, and
ultimately this would be subject to judicial review in the
case of legal dispute, but allowing the data controller to
make a decision in the first instance makes it a cumber-
some process for the data subject to exercise their right
to object/erasure. Secondly, the general right to object27
is applicable only when the legal basis for processing is
Article 6(1)(e) (public interest) or 6(1)(f) (legitimate
interests). To sum up, if manifestly public self-
disclosure were chosen as the permitted exception for
processing a data subject’s genomic data, for that data
subject to exercise their right to erasure, it would have
to be established that either public interest or legitimate
interests is relied upon at the same time as the Article 6
legal basis, and such an interest is overridden by the
data subject’s own interests in having the data erased.28
Moreover, restrictions that can be introduced by
Member States may also vary depending on the chosen
permitted exception for processing sensitive data.
Under the Article 9(2)(a) explicit consent exception, na-
tional laws may ‘provide that the prohibition [on proc-
essing sensitive data] may not be lifted by the data
subject’ through their explicit consent. This effectively
empowers Member States to draw up a national ‘black-
list’ for certain types of processing performed against
sensitive data. A comparable proviso does not exist un-
der Article 9(2)(e), and under the CJEU’s jurisprudence,
this would mean Member States cannot introduce fur-
ther restrictions for cases where the sensitive data are
manifestly made public by the data subject.29 It should
be noted, however, that Article 9(4) provides that
‘Member States may maintain or introduce further con-
ditions, including limitations, with regard to the proc-
essing of genetic data, biometric data or data
22 Art 15(1) GDPR.
23 Art 17(3)(d) GDPR.
24 Art 17(1)(c) GDPR.
25 Art 21(1) GDPR.
26 GC and Others v Commission Nationale de l’Informatique et des Libertés
(CNIL), Case C-136/17, [2019] (ECLI:EU:C:2019:773), paras 49–69
<http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?num¼C-136/17> accessed 4
February 2021.
27 As opposed to the special right to object (art 21(2) and (3)), which
applies to data processing for direct marketing purposes and prevents
further processing in an absolute manner (ie no need for a balancing
test).
28 We also note, in passing, that the data subject’s right to data portability
under art 20 may be affected if the processing is justified on the basis of
art 9(2)(e), since this portability right is relevant only when consent or
contract forms a legal basis for such processing and the processing is car-
ried out by automated means.
29 See joined cases ASNEF and FECEMD, Case C-468/10 and Case C-469/
10, [2011] OJ C 25/18 (ECLI:EU:C:2011:777), paras 30–32; see also
Breyer, Case C-582/14, [2016] OJ C 475/3 (ECLI:EU:C:2016:779), para
57.
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concerning health’. While Member States may invoke
this provision to legislate restrictions on the use of such
data, regardless of the chosen legitimizing ground under
Article 9(2), it is unclear if this amounts to the power to
prohibit such processing altogether, considering the dif-
ferent wording from Article 9(2)(a).
The question remains, though, whether explicit con-
sent is valid if the purposes of subsequent, downstream
data processing are (relatively) unclear. If DPAs were to
contest the validity of a consent for ‘research use’ in
general, we query how much more they should refuse to
accept that explicit consent can be the basis for ‘anyone
can do anything’, as would be the case with a truly open
access platform, reflected in the language in PGP and
openSNP discussed above. This would, of course, differ
in the context of a controlled access or semi-open plat-
form that restricts to some degree the purposes of data
use (eg bona fide research) and those who can access
the data (eg bona fide researchers); yet this kind of limi-
tation would not seem to fall under manifest public self-
disclosure, but rather consent to make data available for
(more) defined purposes. Though even here, it is diffi-
cult to argue in favour of the validity of an explicit con-
sent if research use is broader than a certain disease or,
at most, something like ‘health research’.30
Certain Member States have made use of Article 9(4)
to prohibit certain types of processing of genetic data
(Greece, eg prohibits the processing of genetic data for
health and life insurance purposes31). However, while to
our knowledge, no Member State has so far prohibited
the publication of genetic data, some have put in place
restrictions, in particular when the publishing means
that data can be used subsequently outside the GDPR
jurisdiction.32 What is also relevant, though, is that
some Member States require consent33—and consent is
often seen as not valid if subsequent use and users can-
not be defined precisely. As such, it might be seen as an
indirect prohibition.
With all these different legal consequences resulting
from the choice between Article 9(2)(a) and Article
9(2)(e), it can be concluded that recognizing explicit
consent as the permitted exception would lead to a
wider range of safeguards afforded to the data subject
and as a result, a wider range of duties imposed on the
data controller. This could be seen as creating a compli-
ance incentive for downstream data users to opt for the
data subject’s manifest public self-disclosure as the per-
mitted exception, or, if possible, scientific research un-
der Article 9(2)(j).
In practice, then, this would mean that the operators
of open genome platforms may feel more inclined to
draft their terms and conditions in such a way that a
data subject’s uploading of their data amounts to mak-
ing such data publicly available, or to design their plat-
form in such a way that the involvement of the platform
is kept to a minimum and their role is closer to a file
sharing service. Third-party projects making use of the
genomic data may also have a stronger tendency to
choose a platform where data have been shared this
way. Of course, there will be other considerations such
as commercial reputation, ethical restrictions, data in-
tegrity, and confidentiality, and the impact on the re-
cruitment of participants. Generally speaking, however,
if one could broadly argue for using genomic data based
on Article 9(2)(e), this could potentially undermine the
interests of the data subject by removing the safeguards
that would otherwise apply, were an alternative legal ba-
sis chosen. In this regard, from the viewpoint of protect-
ing the data subject, it is important that the scope of
Article 9(2)(e) be construed narrowly. The validity of
relying on this exception depends on whether the ar-
rangement genuinely reflects the technical configura-
tions of the platform, as well as the actual legal
relationship between the data subject and the controller.
A cautious approach to Article 9(2)(e), however, does
not necessarily lead to disproportionate compliance bur-
dens on downstream users. If they are bona fide research-
ers, they can rely on the legal basis for the primary
collection of the genetic data—whether explicit consent or
the research exemption—as long as the secondary use of
such data is compatible with the original purpose (which is
presumed to be the case under Article 5(1)(b)). They would
30 See eg Recital 33 GDPR, which states that ‘. . .data subjects should be
allowed to give their consent to certain areas of scientific research when
in keeping with recognized ethical standards for scientific research. Data
subjects should have the opportunity to give their consent only to certain
areas of research or parts of research projects to the extent allowed by the
intended purpose’.
31 Law 4624/2019 (Greece), art 23.
32 See eg Danish Data Protection Act (Law No 502 of 23/05/2018), art 10.
33 Spain, for example, in its Seventeenth Additional Provision of the
Organic Law on Data Protection and Guarantee of Digital Rights,
requires consent as an additional safeguard regardless of the actual ex-
emption chosen to justify the use of sensitive data. See Iciar Alfonso
Farnós, Guillermo Alcalde Bezhold, and Miriam Méndez Garcı́a,
‘Cuestionario/guı́a para la evaluación de proyectos de investigación con
datos por un CEI / Questionnaire/guide for the evaluation of research
projects with personal data by a Research Ethics Committee’ (2019)
Extra 1 Revista de derecho y genoma humano (Law and the Human
Genome Review) 25; Asociación Nacional de Comités de Ética de la
Investigación (ANCEI), ‘Guı́as y Recomendaciones’ (2020) <https://
ancei.es/guias-y-recomendaciones/> accessed 4 February 2021. See also
Jiahong Chen, Edward S Dove and Himani Bhakuni, ‘Explicit Consent
and Alternative Data Protection Processing Grounds for Health
Research’ in Eleni Kosta and Ronald Leenes (eds), Research Handbook on
EU Data Protection (Edward Elgar forthcoming).







niversity of Edinburgh user on 30 M
arch 2021
not have to ask the data subject for their explicit consent
again,34 but the safeguards associated with Articles 9(2)(a)
and (j) would remain available to the data subject. We ac-
knowledge that there will be challenges for downstream
users to rely on explicit consent (eg the ‘specific’ require-
ment and the possibility of withdrawal of consent) or the
research exemption (eg the need for national legislation
and cross-border issues, as discussed below in the next sec-
tion), but the data subject’s public self-disclosure should be
a last resort only when neither of those options proves pos-
sible and all conditions, set out later in this article, are satis-
fied. This would be a more balanced approach between
protecting data subjects and promoting scientific research.
The differences mirrored in these options, again, high-
light the importance of identifying the appropriate per-
mitted exception under Article 9(2). It is therefore
especially crucial for the operator of an open genome
platform to explicitly specify the chosen legal basis for
the primary collection of data. Uncertainty in such a
choice by the platform (as in the case of PGP-UK and
openSNP) does not help downstream users navigate such
different compliance options. For the operator of a ge-
nome sharing platform and the downstream users alike,
the next question would be under what conditions the
uploading of a user’s genetic data can be considered an
act of making such data manifestly public. In the next
section, we outline the scope of Article 9(2)(e) by review-
ing guidelines issued by DPAs and the relevant case law.
The curious case of ‘manifest’ self-
disclosure in data protection law
In practice, choosing the lawfulness ground and permit-
ted exception for using sensitive data in genomic re-
search is perhaps not as simple as it seems and is
dependent on the function of the data-sharing platform,
but a general discussion with the three platforms dis-
cussed above would nevertheless be helpful as a typical
operational model. In this section, we first examine the
general prohibition on processing sensitive data under
Article 9 GDPR and the applicability of a few common
exemptions, and then provide a more specific analysis
of the different approaches to the scope of public self-
disclosure, before advocating our case for a more re-
strictive interpretation of this provision.
Applicability and the exemptions of Article 9
GDPR
There should be little doubt that genomic data consti-
tute one form of genetic data—in both scientific and
legal terms—to the extent that the former is a genome-
wide type of the latter.35 Genetic data is defined by the
GDPR as ‘personal data relating to the inherited or ac-
quired genetic characteristics of a natural person which
give unique information about the physiology or the
health of that natural person and which result, in par-
ticular, from an analysis of a biological sample from
the natural person in question’,36 including ‘chromo-
somal, deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) or ribonucleic
acid (RNA) analysis, or from the analysis of another el-
ement enabling equivalent information to be
obtained’.37 For all three platforms mentioned above,
the data uploaded by a user would fall squarely within
this definition.
What is sometimes less clear, however, is whether
such data would be covered by data protection law as
personal data in the first place. While GenomeConnect
claims that the shared data is ‘de-identified’, it is ques-
tionable whether the degree of de-identification is suffi-
cient to pass the anonymity test under the GDPR,
namely ‘the data subject is not or no longer identifiable’,
taking into account all the means reasonably likely to be
used to achieve identifiability, such as singling out, ei-
ther by the controller or by another person to identify
the natural person directly or indirectly, and consider-
ing objective factors, such as the costs of and the
amount of time required for identification, as well as
the available technology at the time of the processing
and technological developments.38 Depending on the
actual arrangements of a particular scheme, the operator
of the sharing platform may or may not have kept a re-
cord of the participants’ identities. The enrolment pro-
cess of PGP-UK, for example, includes a stage of
identity verification, which would likely allow the oper-
ating research team to attribute a set of genomic data to
an identifiable individual. Other platforms may decide
not to collect personal or demographic details about the
volunteers and simply function like a file storage and
sharing service. Either way, it is highly unlikely that the
downstream users of such platforms would be given ac-
cess to the personal details (eg names or other identi-
fiers) of the data subject uploaders. Yet, the fact that
34 See Recital 50 GDPR.
35 Clare Bycroft and others, ‘The UK Biobank Resource with Deep
Phenotyping and Genomic Data’ (2018) 562(7726) Nature 203–09; see
also World Health Organization, ‘WHO Definitions of Genetics and
Genomics’ <https://www.who.int/genomics/geneticsVSgenomics/en/>
accessed 4 February 2021.
36 Art 4(13) GDPR.
37 Recital 34 GDPR.
38 Recital 26 GDPR.
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the platform operators and/or the downstream data
users do not have access to the identities of the
data subject does not automatically render the genomic
data in question ‘anonymous information’.39 Existing
research has shown how re-association can be possible
based on phenotypic40 or otherwise available genetic
information.41 In a hypothetical scenario, police may
compare a piece of genetic information of a suspect
against genomic datasets, which could immediately
make a matched record identifiable. As such, given the
uniqueness of one’s genomic sequence, we consider ge-
nomic data, even not linked to other forms of identi-
fiers, personal and sensitive data under the GDPR.42
Once it is established that a set of data is brought
within the scope of Article 9, as noted above, the proc-
essing of such data would be subject to a general prohi-
bition unless one of the exemptions provided for by
Article 9(2) applies. Among those ten listed exemptions,
several stand out as potentially relevant to the process-
ing of genomic data: explicit consent (point (a)); mani-
fest public availability (point (e)); substantial public
interest (point (g)); health or social care (point (h));
public health (point (i)); and archiving, scientific re-
search or statistics (point (j)). The latter two provisions
are relevant where the data are used by researchers, and
some of these provisions may come across as particu-
larly pertinent in a time of public health crisis, such as
points (g) and (i).43 The rest of this article will, how-
ever, only focus on explicit consent and manifest public
availability for a number of reasons. First, some of the
exemptions are clearly applicable only to emergency-
type scenarios (eg vital interests of the data subject),
professional care services (eg health or social care), or
situations in which processing is necessary for reasons
of ‘substantial public interest’, including those for pub-
lic health, and not to the day-to-day operation of an
open genome platform, either for making the data avail-
able in the first instance or for using the data for subse-
quent purposes. Second, explicit consent and public
self-disclosure are the only two exemptions requiring
the data subject’s voluntariness in the first place, as op-
posed to the mandatory nature of the other exemptions.
Third, and as a related point, all other grounds men-
tioned above—including the seemingly promising sci-
entific research provision under Article 9(2)(j)—
explicitly require Member State laws to provide a legal
basis (which, to the disappointment of many scientists,
makes cross-border processing of genomic and health-
related data exceedingly difficult in Europe). Fourth,
and consequently, relying on these other exemptions
may potentially subject an open genome initiative—es-
pecially as an international collaboration—to the uncer-
tainty of applicable data protection law and the
fragmentation of national rules across the EU.44 For
these reasons, Article 9(2)(a) explicit consent (drafted
somewhat broadly to cover future, downstream pur-
poses) and Article 9(2)(e) manifest public self-
disclosure seem to be the most practical bases—both for
the establishment and operation of an international
open genomic data platform as well as the subsequent,
downstream uses of such data for research. This said,
we recognize that genomic projects keeping data within
individual Member States (ie not making the data avail-
able across jurisdictions) may find that the scientific re-
search provision is the most suitable provision.
What remains uncertain is when a researcher, for ex-
ample, intends to gain access to the data via one of the
platforms mentioned above, can they lawfully do so on
the basis that the volunteer has given their explicit con-
sent? Or that such data have been made manifestly
available to the public by the volunteer? While there has
been a significant amount of theoretical and practical
discussions surrounding explicit consent as a permitted
exception, the alternative option of manifest public
availability remains largely unexplored. The next two
sub-sections will thus focus on the scope of Article
9(2)(e).
39 Yaniv Erlich and others, ‘Redefining Genomic Privacy: Trust and
Empowerment’ (2014) 12(11) PLoS Biology e1001983; Mahsa Shabani
and Luca Marelli, ‘Re-identifiability of Genomic Data and the GDPR’
(2019) 20(6) EMBO Reports e48316.
40 Christoph Lippert and others, ‘Identification of Individuals by Trait
Prediction using Whole-Genome Sequencing Data’ (2017) 114(38)
PNAS 10166–71.
41 Yaniv Erlich and others, ‘Identity Inference of Genomic Data Using
Long-Range Familial Searches’ (2018) 362(6415) Science 690–94. See also
Xinghua Shi and Xintao Wu, ‘An Overview of Human Genetic Privacy’
(2017) 1387(1) Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences 61–72.
42 See also Murat Sariyar, Stephanie Suhr, and Irene Schlünder, ‘How
Sensitive Is Genetic Data?’ (2017) 15(6) Biopreservation and Biobanking
494–501.
43 See European Data Protection Board, Guidelines 03/2020 on the
Processing of Data Concerning Health for the Purpose of Scientific Research
in the Context of the COVID-19 Outbreak (2020), paras 25–27; European
Data Protection Board, Opinion 3/2019 concerning the Questions and
Answers on the interplay between the Clinical Trials Regulation (CTR) and
the General Data Protection regulation (GDPR) (2019) paras 10–14;
European Data Protection Supervisor, A Preliminary Opinion on Data
Protection and Scientific Research (EDPS 2020), s 6.8.
44 We note, however, that fragmentation across the EU may exist all the
same in this particular context, as art 9(4) allows Member States to main-
tain or introduce further conditions, including limitations, with regard
to the processing of genetic data, biometric data or data concerning
health. See also David Townend, ‘Conclusion: Harmonisation in
Genomic and Health Data Sharing for Research: An Impossible Dream?’
(2018) 137(8) Human Genetics 657–64.
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Contradictory interpretations of Article
9(2)(e)
Article 9(2)(e) was perhaps one of the least discussed
provisions in the course of legislating the GDPR. Since
the introduction to the Commission’s first legislative
proposal in 2012,45 this clause has been retained in all
major subsequent versions46 without any question or
debate. The phrase ‘processing relates to personal data
which are manifestly made public by the data subject’ is
a word-by-word repetition of the first half of Article
8(2)(e) DPD, which first appeared in the Council’s
Common Position on the draft DPD in 1995.47
However, the Statement of Reasons by the Council shed
no light on the rationale behind this addition, nor was
it challenged in later stages by the Parliament48 or the
Commission.49 The lack of clarification in the recitals of
the DPD and the GDPR, exacerbated by the lack of doc-
umentation of the legislative deliberation, makes it diffi-
cult to decipher the lawmakers’ considerations when
formulating this exemption. Straightforward as this pro-
vision seems at first glance, it may, as discussed below,
be subject to different interpretations in practice, not
least in the case of open genomic data.
Perhaps because of the lack of any legislative guid-
ance, be it during the debate stages or in the recitals or
legislative text itself, DPAs have adopted a restrictive in-
terpretation of both elements of the self-disclosure ex-
emption, i.e. ‘manifestly made public’ and ‘by the data
subject’. Regarding the first element, the UK’s
Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO), for example,
is of the view that the ‘manifestly made public’ condi-
tion amounts to a test of accessibility by anyone. As
explained in their guidance:
To be manifestly made public, the data must also be realis-
tically accessible to a member of the general public. The
question is not whether it is theoretically in the public do-
main (eg in a publication in a specialist library, or men-
tioned in court), but whether it is actually publicly available
in practice. Disclosures to a limited audience are not neces-
sarily ‘manifestly public’ for these purposes. In particular,
information is not necessarily public just because you have
access to it. The question is whether any hypothetical inter-
ested member of the public could access this information.50
As regards the second element, the ‘by the data subject’
condition, the ICO has emphasized the importance of
the awareness and voluntariness by the data subject,
something that we saw in at least two of the platforms
discussed above:
You need to be confident that it was the individual them-
selves who actively chose to make their special category
data public and that this was unmistakably a deliberate act
on their part. There is a difference between assenting to or
being aware of publication, and an individual actively mak-
ing information available. For example, by blogging about
their health condition or political views. You might also
find it hard to show that someone has manifestly made in-
formation public if, for example, they made a social media
post for family and friends but default audience settings
made this public. You should therefore be very cautious
about using this condition to justify your use of special cat-
egory data obtained from social media posts.51
In other words, the data subject’s misunderstanding of
who would have actual access to their data may render
the disclosure involuntary, and as a result, the process-
ing invalid altogether. Given that a data controller may
have no ability to determine whether the data subject
had a misunderstanding of ‘default audience settings’
and who could access their data, this would seem to set
45 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council
on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal
data and on the free movement of such data (General Data Protection
Regulation) (2012) <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?
uri¼COM:2012:0011:FIN> accessed 4 February 2021.
46 European Parliament legislative resolution of 12 March 2014 on the pro-
posal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on
the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal
data and on the free movement of such data (General Data Protection
Regulation) (COM(2012)0011 — C7-0025/2012 — 2012/0011(COD))
(Ordinary legislative procedure: first reading) <https://eur-lex.europa.
eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri¼celex:52014AP0212> accessed 4 February
2021. See also Position (EU) No 6/2016 of the Council at first reading
with a view to the adoption of a Regulation of the European Parliament
and of the Council on the protection of natural persons with regard to
the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data,
and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation)
Adopted by the Council on 8 April 2016, OJ 2016 C 159/1 <https://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri¼celex:52016AG0006(01)>
accessed 4 February 2021.
47 Common Position (EC) No 1/95 adopted by the Council on 20 February
1995 with a view to adopting Directive 95/. . ./EC of the European
Parliament and of the Council of . . . on the protection of individuals
with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement
of such data, OJ 1995 C 93/1 <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/
EN/TXT/PDF/?uri¼CELEX:51995AG0413(01)&from¼EN> accessed 4
February 2021.
48 Minutes of Proceedings of the Sitting on Thursday, 15 June 1995 (95/C
166/04) <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri¼
OJ:JOC_1995_166_R_0077_01&from¼EN> accessed 4 February 2021.
49 Opinion of the Commission pursuant to art 189 b (2) (d) of the EC
Treaty, on the European Parliament’s amendments to the Council’s com-
mon position regarding the proposal for a European Parliament and
Council Directive on the protection of individuals with regard to the
processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data
(COM(95) 375 final-COD287) (1995) <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri¼CELEX:51995DC0375&from¼EN> accessed
4 February 2021.




accessed 4 February 2021.
51 Ibid.
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a high bar for Article 9(2)(e) to be met. The need for
confidence in an ‘unmistakably deliberate act’ by the
data subject themselves would permit the use of only a
narrow range of personal data self-disclosures.
This view is shared by data protection legal scholars
Ludmila Georgieva and Christopher Kuner, who write:
Sensitive data may be processed when the data subject has
manifestly made them public. In this context, ‘making pub-
lic’ should be construed to include publishing the data in
the mass media, putting them on online social network
platforms or similar actions. However, the data must have
been ‘manifestly’ made public, which requires an affirma-
tive act by the data subject, and that he or she realised that
this would be the result. The EDPB has stated that ‘data
controllers processing those data in the context of video
surveillance cannot rely on Article 9(2)(e), which allows
processing that relates to personal data that are manifestly
made public by the data subject. The mere fact of entering
into the range of the camera does not imply that the data
subject intends to make public special categories of data re-
lating to him or her’. Data processing will not fall within
this exception if the data have been made public illegally.52
While Georgieva and Kuner do not go so far as to cast
doubt on social media posts per se, unlike the ICO’s
guidance, they do also suggest that controllers must
have confidence that the data subject themselves made
an affirmative act to disclose their data, and that they
were aware this disclosure would make the data public
(ie neither private nor semi-private).
DPAs at EU level also seem to share a similar view
with these statements. The Handbook on European Data
Protection Law, which is published jointly by the
Council of Europe and the European Union, provides
high-level guidance on this exception:
Article 9(2)(e) of the GDPR provides that processing is not
prohibited if it relates to data which are manifestly made
public by the data subject. Even though the meaning of
‘manifestly made public by the data subject’ is not defined
in the regulation, since it is an exception to prohibiting sen-
sitive data processing, it must be construed strictly and as re-
quiring the data subject to deliberately make his or her
personal data public. Thus, where the television broadcasts a
video taken from a video surveillance camera, showing,
among other things, a firefighter getting injured trying to
evacuate a building, it cannot be considered that the fire-
fighter has manifestly made public the data. On the other
hand, if the firefighter decides to describe the incident and
publish the video and photos on a public internet page, he
or she would have made a deliberate, affirmative act to make
the personal data public. It is important to note that making
one’s data public does not constitute consent, but it is another
permission for processing special categories of data.
The fact that the data subject had made public the proc-
essed personal data does not exempt controllers from their
obligations under data protection law. For instance, the
principle of purpose limitation continues to apply to per-
sonal data even if such data have been made publicly
available.53
The Article 29 Working Party (now the EDPB) has con-
ducted an analysis of the equivalent provision in the
Law Enforcement Directive (LE Directive)54 concerning
self-disclosure. While the GDPR and the LE Directive
are mutually exclusive in terms of their scope, the two
instruments share the fundamental objective of protect-
ing personal data, and almost the same wording can be
found in Article 9(2)(e) GDPR and Article 10(c) of the
LE Directive. Hence, the examination of the latter
should be highly relevant, if not fully applicable, to the
interpretation of the former. In fact, the current
European Data Protection Supervisor has cited the
Working Party’s analysis of the LE Directive to support
his interpretation of Article 9(2)(e) GDPR in the con-
text of scientific research—a matter governed by the
GDPR:
Special categories of data may be processed if the data sub-
ject has manifestly made them public. EU data protection
authorities have argued that this provision has to be ‘inter-
preted to imply that the data subject was aware that the re-
spective data will be publicly available which means to
everyone’ including, in this case, researchers, and that, ‘In
case of doubt, a narrow interpretation should be applied, as
the assumption is that the data subject has voluntarily given
up the special protection for sensitive data by making them
available to the public including authorities’. Publishing
personal data in a biography or an article in the press is not
the same as posting a message on a social media page.55
In explaining when competent law enforcement author-
ities may use sensitive data based on public self-
disclosure by the data subject, the Working Party has
opined that ‘this has to be interpreted to imply that the
data subject was aware that the respective data will be
52 Georgieva and Kuner (n 7) 378.
53 European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, European Court of
Human Rights, European Data Protection Supervisor, Handbook on
European Data Protection Law (Publications Office of the European
Union 2018), 162–63 (emphasis added).
54 Directive (EU) 2016/680 of the European Parliament and of the Council
of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the
processing of personal data by competent authorities for the purposes of
the prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offen-
ces or the execution of criminal penalties, and on the free movement of
such data, and repealing Council Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA, OJ
2016 L 119/89.
55 European Data Protection Supervisor, A Preliminary Opinion on Data
Protection and Scientific Research (EDPS, 2020), s 6.3 (p 19).
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publicly available which means to everyone including
authorities’.56 Further examples are provided:
In cases such as the publishing of personal data in a biogra-
phy, in the press or on a public website the intention is
clear. In other cases, this is more difficult to decide. For ex-
ample, registering for a social network might include the
acceptance of certain data protection rules which provide
that all the partners of the provider (including national po-
lice authorities) have access to personal data. In such cases
most of the users probably do not actively take notice of
this and are in fact not aware that their data are available to
police authorities.57
In practice, however, courts seem to have embraced
broader interpretations than those of DPAs and legal
commentators, thereby casting a wider scope. For the
‘manifestly made public’ condition, while the Court of
Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has not yet had
an opportunity to expound on that requirement under
the GDPR, there is case law at EU level dealing with the
same issue under Regulation 45/200158 (now replaced
by Regulation 2018/172559)—which governs the use of
personal data by EU institutions. As with the LE
Directive, Regulation 45/2001 (as well as its successor)
contains the same self-disclosure exemption, with iden-
tical wording, to the general prohibition on processing
of sensitive data.60
In Esch-Leonhardt and Others v ECB,61 the CJEU’s
Court of First Instance (now the General Court) had to
decide whether the applicants could request the removal
of an email from their personnel profiles on the basis
that it contained sensitive data. The applicants were
employees of the European Central Bank (ECB) and
were union members of the International and European
Public Services Organization (IPSO). They made
requests that the ECB remove from their personnel pro-
files an email sent by them to all staff and signed on be-
half of IPSO, on the grounds that the email contained
sensitive data about their union membership and there
was no justification to store such data in their profiles.
The Court rejected their claim and reasoned that, even
if the reference to IPSO revealed the applicants’ union
membership, the processing of such data was justified
by the fact that the applicants made this information
manifestly public within the ECB by signing off their
email with the IPSO signature line.62 Clearly, the Court
did not take the view that the ‘manifestly made public’
condition equals ‘accessibility by anyone’ or universally
public; rather, the criterion of ‘public’ here, following
the Court’s logic, should be appropriate to the context
in which the data are processed. This could mean ‘pub-
lic’ within a defined community setting, such as an or-
ganization or network. In other words, the court’s
broader notion of ‘public’ renders it possible to argue
that making data public in a confined space, and keep-
ing them within that confined space, provides sufficient
legitimation to process the data.
As for the ‘by the data subject’ condition, the volun-
tariness test has also been interpreted in a broader man-
ner by the courts. In NT1 & NT2 v Google LLC,63 for
example, the High Court of Justice for England and
Wales considered whether the claimants could exercise
their ‘right to be forgotten’ against Google in relation to
de-referencing the search results about their past crimi-
nal convictions. When assessing whether Google could
process such sensitive data on the basis that the data
had been made manifestly public by the data subject,
the Court analysed the wording of Article 8(2)(e) DPD
as well as Schedule 3 of the Data Protection Act 1998
(as the UK’s transposition of the DPD), and concluded
that:
It does not require a deliberate decision or ‘step’ by the
data subject ‘to make’ the information public, but rather
(a) the taking by him of a deliberate step or steps, as a result
of which (b) the information is ‘made public’. A person
who deliberately conducts himself in a criminal fashion
runs the risk of apprehension, prosecution, trial, convic-
tion, and sentence. Publicity for what happens at a trial is
the ordinary consequence of the open justice principle [. . .]
The same must be true of the details of the offending, and
other information disclosed in open court, including infor-
mation about himself which a criminal reveals at a trial or
in the course of an application. [. . .] I attach weight to the
fact that a narrow interpretation would tend towards the
unacceptable conclusion discussed above. I see a good deal
of force in the point made by [Google] that if this condition
were not available in respect of processing of this nature it
is hard to see how ordinary members of the public could
56 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion on Some Key Issues of
the Law Enforcement Directive (EU 2016/680) at 10 <http://ec.europa.eu/
newsroom/just/document.cfm?doc_id¼48804> accessed 4 February
2021.
57 Ibid.
58 Regulation (EC) No 45/2001 of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 18 December 2000 on the protection of individuals with re-
gard to the processing of personal data by the Community institutions
and bodies and on the free movement of such data, OJ 2001 L 8/1
<https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri¼
celex:32001R0045> accessed 4 February 2021.
59 Regulation (EU) 2018/1725 of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 23 October 2018 on the protection of natural persons with re-
gard to the processing of personal data by the Union institutions, bodies,
offices and agencies and on the free movement of such data, and repeal-
ing Regulation (EC) No 45/2001 and Decision No 1247/2002/EC, OJ
2018 L 295/39 <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri¼
CELEX%3A32018R1725> accessed 4 February 2021.
60 Art 10(2)(d) reg 45/2001; art 10(2)(e) reg 2018/1725.
61 Case T-320/02 (ECLI:EU:T:2004:45).
62 Ibid para 57.
63 [2018] EWHC 799 (QB).







niversity of Edinburgh user on 30 M
arch 2021
lawfully discuss online the convictions (whether recent or
historic) of those appearing before the courts.64
According to the High Court, the causal connection be-
tween the data subject’s action and the consequence
that the information has been made public does not
have to be as strong as the ICO has suggested. This of
course does not mean that any publicly available sensi-
tive data can be processed based on the Article 9(2)(e)
self-disclosure exemption, not least because some of
them might have been made public unlawfully.65
Equally though, under the Court’s interpretation, the
disclosure does not have to be an action directly trigger-
ing the dissemination of the sensitive data.
The courts’ relatively broad interpretation of these
two conditions presents a stark contrast to the clearly
more cautious approach taken by the regulators. It is
perhaps conceivable why, from the regulators’ point of
view, limiting the scope of Article 9(2)(e) is desirable
for maintaining a general balance between the data sub-
ject and the data controller: if ‘manifestly made public’
can be stretched to mean a group of people, this may
lead to an arbitrary definition of ‘public’, even in cases
such as private group messages; if ‘by the data subject’
were also to cover unintentional acts, data subjects may
find themselves deprived of the protection when the
sensitive data are, for example, leaked to the public by
accident. The courts, however, are understandably more
mindful of the specifics of the cases at hand, focusing
on whether the data subject can fairly claim that the in-
formation remains in the private domain.
It should be pointed out that the ‘manifestly made
public’ and ‘by the data subject’ elements are not neces-
sarily met or unmet at the same time. It can be argued,
for example, that the data concerned in ECB are indeed
made available ‘by the data subject’ with a voluntary in-
tention, but only to a specific group of people rather
than virtually anyone, and thus fail the ICO’s ‘mani-
festly made public’ criterion, but not the Court’s.
Likewise, fulfilling the ‘manifestly made public’ condi-
tion does not guarantee the fulfilment of the ‘by the
data subject’ condition. We expound on this point fur-
ther in the next section.
A strict interpretation for genomic research?
These somewhat differing interpretive approaches to the
meaning of ‘manifestly made public by the data subject’
in data protection law signify the complexity of
balancing sometimes conflicting interests in the use of
sensitive data, which is not helped by the lack of legisla-
tive guidance. Specifically, in the case of using genomic
data submitted by the data subject to an open platform,
the interests involved are both the informational self-
determination of the data subject and the (putative) so-
cietal benefits of scientific research activities, though of
course, given the open nature of such a platform, the
purposes may not be scientific research, much less
something of societal benefit. Moreover, these values do
not necessarily have to come into conflict and in fact,
they are aligned on a fundamental level: one of the
foundational assumptions underlying data protection
and confidentiality law is that the value of information
sharing can be optimized only when people voluntarily
disclose such information based on the trust that the in-
formation will be protected.66 Likewise, open genome
initiatives would not achieve their objective if donation
of genetic data is deterred by the lack of protection and
control given to the donating volunteers.
The challenging part is where exactly the line should be
drawn so these private and public interests can be best co-
ordinated. With regard to what should be the appropriate
permitted exception under Article 9(2) for using genomic
data contributed by the data subject themselves, the differ-
ences between explicit consent and manifest self-disclosure
can be subtle but not insignificant. As explained in detail
in the previous section, relying on explicit consent would
give the data subject a more straightforward corollary right
to withdraw their consent and to subsequently request the
erasure of data, but subject to the condition that this would
not render the objective of research unachievable. This
said, relying on manifestly public self-disclosure would still
allow the data subject to object to the processing of their
data, but whether that would lead to the erasure of data
depends on a balancing assessment carried out by the data
controller. As such, neither option would guarantee exclu-
sive control by one side and leave the other side with no
control at all. Yet, when it comes to who has greater con-
trol in the two scenarios, explicit consent tilts more toward
the data subject, whereas manifestly public self-disclosure
tilts more toward the data controller. The different legal
consequences essentially mirror various degrees to which
the data subject is considered to have given up some con-
trol of their data under different circumstances.
To the extent that the selection of the legal basis un-
der Article 6(1) and permitted exception under Article
9(2) may determine the range of legal safeguards
64 Ibid paras 111–13.
65 See Georgieva and Kuner (n 7) 378.
66 For a classic theory of the value of privacy, see Richard Posner, ‘The
Economics of Privacy’ (1981) 71(2) The American Economic Review
405–09. For a more up-to-date overview of different theories, see
Alessandro Acquisti, Curtis Taylor and Liad Wagman, ‘The Economics
of Privacy’ (2016) 54(2) Journal of Economic Literature 442–92.
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available to the data subject, this should not always be a
matter of unilateral choice by the data controller—and
sometimes not even a bilateral choice by both the data
controller and the data subject, when such a choice
proves manifestly unfair. This is perhaps something bet-
ter discussed in the literature regarding the relationship
between consent and contract as two separate legal
grounds for processing of non-sensitive data.67 The key
question here concerns whether, for example, an inter-
mediary such as a website may include the permission
of using personal data for advertising purposes as an in-
separable part of the contractual obligations on the
user. The Working Party has discussed this issue in vari-
ous Opinions under both the DPD and the GDPR,68
and they consistently maintain that:
The provision [Article 7(b), performance of contract as a
legitimising basis] must be interpreted strictly and does not
cover situations where the processing is not genuinely neces-
sary for the performance of a contract, but rather unilater-
ally imposed on the data subject by the controller. Also the
fact that some data processing is covered by a contract does
not automatically mean that the processing is necessary for
its performance. For example, Article 7(b) is not a suitable
legal ground for building a profile of the user’s tastes and
lifestyle choices based on his clickstream on a website and
the items purchased. This is because the data controller has
not been contracted to carry out profiling, but rather to de-
liver particular goods and services, for example. Even if
these processing activities are specifically mentioned in the
small print of the contract, this fact alone does not make
them ‘necessary’ for the performance of the contract.69
It is therefore clear that a data controller cannot force the
legal basis for their use of personal data in a merely formu-
laic manner by explicitly stating their choice in an agree-
ment. They are sometimes bound by the actual
circumstances that define the nature of their relationship
with the data subject. By the same token, just because an
open genome sharing platform has made it clear to the
data subjects-participants that ‘the uploaded data will be
accessible by anyone’, it does not mean that the platform
or data users can always lawfully rely on the exception of
manifestly public self-disclosure by the data subject.
Instead, and as we elaborate later in the next section below,
one must examine whether the data subject’s permission is
meant for a specific group of persons to process the data
for a specific purpose (in which case explicit consent or sci-
entific research should be the appropriate exception) or
simply to make certain information known to unspecified
persons (in which case manifestly public self-disclosure
should be the appropriate exception). In short, ‘manifestly
made public’ is not related to a specific use only. It can in-
clude specific use and it can be a driving force, but it would
still have to be communicated that the use is general.
A legal test for Article 9(2)(e)
In this section, we weave the preceding analysis together
to propose a legal test for controllers to ascertain
whether they can rely upon Article 9(2)(e) as a permit-
ted exception to process special category personal data.
Our specific focus remains on genomic data in the open
genomic data-sharing platform context, but we intend
the test to be universally applicable across all special cat-
egory data contexts.
Our test breaks down the provision ‘relates to per-
sonal data which are manifestly made public by the data
subject’ into its constituent elements. The constituent
elements are threefold: (i) processing [that] relates to
personal data; (ii) personal data which are manifestly
made public; and (iii) [personal data] manifestly made
public by the data subject. All three elements, we argue,
are grounded in the intent and reasonable expectations
of the data subject. Unlike other exceptions under
Article 9(2), this exception rests on a voluntary, deliber-
ate action undertaken by the data subject. For that rea-
son alone, a narrow interpretation is warranted,
arguably even more so than the other listed exceptions
under Article 9(2).
The first arm of the test must consider whether the
processing ‘relates to personal data’. This arm of the test
has a relatively low threshold to meet. In our view, this
means that the data processing activity must have a di-
rect connection with the special category of personal
data under consideration. Thus, the first arm would be
met where a controller wished to process any special
category of personal data concerning an individual, and
that personal data emanates from the data subject
themself.
The second arm of the test must consider ‘personal
data which are manifestly made public’. Here, focusing
on the word ‘manifestly’, we argue that there must be
clear evidence of a deliberate, affirmative act by the data
subject themself to make their data available, such as
67 Frederik Zuiderveen Borgesius, ‘Personal Data Processing for
Behavioural Targeting: Which Legal Basis?’ (2015) 5(3) International
Data Privacy Law 163–76; Philipp Hacker, ‘Personal Data, Exploitative
Contracts, and Algorithmic Fairness: Autonomous Vehicles Meet the
Internet of Things’ (2017) 7(4) International Data Privacy Law 266–86.
68 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 15/2011 on the
Definition of Consent (01197/11/EN, WP187) 7–8; Article 29 Data
Protection Working Party, Opinion 06/2014 on the Notion of Legitimate
Interests of the Data Controller under Article 7 of Directive 95/46/EC (844/
14/EN, WP 217) 16–17; Article 29 Data Protection Working Party,
Guidelines on Consent under Regulation 2016/679 (17/EN, WP259 rev.01)
8–10.
69 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 06/2014 (n 68) 16–17
(emphasis in original).







niversity of Edinburgh user on 30 M
arch 2021
inclusion of their signature or a social media post from
their account or, in our genetic context of an open ac-
cess platform, they themselves voluntarily and know-
ingly uploading a file of their genetic data (or other
special category data). This focuses on the intent of the
data subject and requires evidence of an intentional,
voluntary, positive act made by them to manifestly
make their personal data public. Explicit manifestation
of the intention predominates in this assessment. We
therefore reject a standard of implied intention, or what
might be called the ‘reasonable data subject’ standard, ie
that it is acceptable for the controller to establish that,
in the circumstances of the particular case, a reasonable
person in the data subject’s position would be likely to
consider their personal data as having been manifestly
made public. We ascribe to the narrow interpretation of
this permitted exception; adopting an explicit, reason-
able data subject standard opens the door too widely for
uses of sensitive data that the data subject would not
necessarily be aware of, and had never considered they
had made ‘public’ in the first place. It should, however,
be clarified that this criterion does not amount to an
‘absolute’ standard that inquires only about the true in-
tention of the data subject, regardless of any evidence.
What is required is objective evidence (eg a record of
signature) of the explicit subjective intention (e.g. a
statement of making the uploaded file accessible by any-
one)—an intention that would also pass the ‘public’
test, as explained below. The intentional element we ad-
vance here aligns more closely with the DPA’s narrow
interpretation (although not identically), and points to-
wards ways in which this can be evidenced in practice.
This second arm of the test also must consider the
meaning of the word ‘public’. As with the UK’s ICO, we
interpret this phrase literally and as meaning actually
publicly available in practice. In this sense, then, we
agree with the ICO’s interpretation that this part of the
test must consider ‘whether any hypothetical interested
member of the public could access this information’.
Applying that test to the facts of Esch-Leonhardt and
Others v ECB would result in a very different outcome:
the Court would have had to rule that the emails were
not manifestly public because not any hypothetical in-
terested member of the public could access their
emails—only those receiving them (or otherwise having
access to them) could. In our view, ‘public’ must mean
available to everyone. Similar to the language in Recital
26 of the GDPR, for everyone to ‘hypothetically have ac-
cess’ to the personal data, account should be taken of all
the means reasonably likely to be used to access the
data, and to ascertain this, account should be taken of
all objective factors, such as the costs of and the amount
of time required for accessing the data, taking into
consideration the available technology at the time of the
processing and technological developments. In other
words, in addition to what has been set out in the
DPA’s guidance, if a disproportionate, resource-
intensive amount of effort is needed to access the data,
it is less likely to be considered ‘public’.
Finally, the third arm of the test must consider ‘by
the data subject’. Here, we also adopt a literal interpre-
tation of the phrase: it must be the data subject who
makes their personal data manifestly public, or at least
initiates the action to make their data public. Applying
this element of test to the question we posed in the in-
troduction about the role of intermediaries in the pro-
cess of making an individual’s data manifestly public,
there would need to be a clear indication made by the
data subject that they were relying upon the intermedi-
ary to make their data public. For example, in the social
media setting, this would be clear reliance on an ISP
and Twitter, by logging into one’s Twitter account
(with one’s personally identifying information available
to everyone) and then tweeting a post containing sensi-
tive information. Here, the act of tweeting alone would
signal clear reliance on the intermediary. In the open ge-
nomic data platform scenario, there would likely need
to be a stronger signal of reliance on the platform given
that the data are much more extensive and ‘raw’ than a
short-form tweet and less common than something like
a blog post or Facebook update. Here, it may be advis-
able for open genomic platforms to require data subjects
to explicitly acknowledge that they are relying on them
to make their genetic data available on their platform.
The role of an intermediary and the data subject’s reli-
ance on such a tool are not fully explored in the current
regulatory guidance, something we think worthy of fur-
ther discussion.
To summarize, our three-arm legal test is as follows:
for special category personal data to be lawfully proc-
essed under GDPR Article 9(2)(e), it must be estab-
lished by the person seeking to process the data that:
1. The processing activity is directly connected to those
personal data that have been manifestly made public
by the data subject;
2. There is evidence of a deliberate, affirmative act by
the data subject themself to make their data avail-
able, and the data are public such that any hypothet-
ical interested member of the public could access
them; and
3. The data have been made manifestly public by the
data subject themself (ie directly made public by
them), or the data subject has given a clear indica-
tion to an intermediary to make their data public (ie
indirectly made public by them).
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The foregoing analysis leads us to conclude that while
open genomic platforms can in principle rely on Article
9(2)(e) as a permitted exception, it will need to be care-
fully circumscribed. The threshold to meet each constit-
uent element of the test is high in comparison to
explicit consent under Article 9(2)(a) or scientific re-
search under Article 9(2)(j); this is partly because there
are no protective mechanisms found elsewhere in the
GDPR for this provision, as there are for consent under
Article 7 and for scientific research under Article 89. It
has been noted above that DPAs are wary of interpret-
ing this provision broadly, precisely because there is a
built-in assumption that the data subject has voluntarily
‘given up’ the special protection for sensitive data by
making them available to the public. Residual safe-
guards will still be found in parts of the GDPR to pro-
tect the data and afford the data subject some rights,
but these safeguards are not nearly as robust as they are
for other permitted exceptions such as explicit consent
and scientific research.
As such, it is insufficient for a controller merely to in-
form data subjects that their permitted exception for
processing special category personal data is one of those
listed under Article 9(2). There needs to be an active ful-
filment of the criteria, no matter the permitted excep-
tion invoked. In the case of Article 9(2)(e), the active
intent to manifestly make the data public must come
from the data subject rather than the controller. In
other words, the data subject would need to initiate the
activity of making their genetic data manifestly public
by approaching the platform, and then uploading or
otherwise performing the activity of making the data
public. And, there would need to be a clear intent that
the data subject is aware that doing so would make their
data accessible to anyone. To ensure this, a controller
might consider advising the data subject to actively sig-
nal their acknowledgement of a statement along the
lines of: ‘By uploading your genetic data onto our data-
sharing platform, you acknowledge that you are making
your data manifestly public—that is, openly available
for anyone to access—and that it may be downloaded,
shared, and used by us and other persons, for research
and non-research purposes alike’.
Setting out these strict tests for invoking Article
9(2)(e) means that the potential compliance incentives
as highlighted above would be largely neutralized and
thus much less exploitable as a loophole for evasion of
controller duties. Given this, it seems likely that open
genomic data platforms and downstream users will be
more inclined to rely on a lawful basis under Article
6(1) that is consent, public interest, or legitimate inter-
ests, and a permitted exception under Article 9(2) that
is explicit consent or scientific research, even if it affords
them less flexibility—though, as our earlier examples of
PGP and openSNP suggest, there is scope for 9(2)(e) to
be invoked—if designed and implemented appropri-
ately. Between the two exceptions, undoubtedly explicit
consent affords more control to data subjects, while sci-
entific research affords more control to researcher-
controllers. For those controllers relying on the scien-
tific research provision under Article 9(2)(j), this would
also oblige them to have more control over the data (eg
technical and organizational safeguards, potential access
restrictions) and afford less rights to data subjects under
Articles 12–23. However, while our analysis leads us to
conclude that the exception under Article 9(2) may of-
ten be one other than manifestly public self-disclosure,
this does not automatically mean researchers (as distinct
from other kinds of downstream users) intending to use
the data already available on the platform must always
ask the data subject for consent each time they use the
data. This is because research purposes are presumed to
be ‘compatible purposes’ under Article 5(1)(b), mean-
ing that researchers may in most cases use the data
based on the same original legal basis at the point of ini-
tial collection—whether it is consent, public interest, or
legitimate interests.70 This interpretation should allow
researchers to make use of uploaded genomic data with-
out having to repeat the process of obtaining the data
subject’s consent again (assuming the legal basis was
consent and the original consent was drafted appropri-
ately to account for a specific, defined, and acceptable
range of research purposes), but remain under the data
protection duties associated with consent (notably the
right to erasure). We suggest this approach, driven by
consent at Articles 6(1)(a) and 9(2)(a), will better allow
individuals to maintain ultimate control of their sensi-
tive data. After all, once sensitive data are manifestly
made public by the data subject—put out into the open
for all to access and use—it is difficult if not impossible
to undo it, much less control downstream uses. Phrased
another way, ‘data subject beware’ must be the operat-
ing ethos for Article 9(2)(e).
Conclusion
In this article, we charted the contours of a hitherto
little-discussed provision in European data protection
law: the provision that allows processing of special cate-
gory personal data on the basis that they have been
made manifestly public by the data subject. This
70 Recital 50 GDPR.
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provision has appeared in law since the 1995 DPD, and
currently is found in GDPR Article 9(2)(e). We were
curious as to why such little guidance has been pro-
vided on this provision over the years, given its poten-
tial to be of significant value to research organizations
that want to process health and genetic data without
having to rely on other provisions that might be con-
sidered more onerous or problematic, such as explicit
consent. At the same time, we were concerned that lack
of guidance could lead to misuse or abuse of the provi-
sion. We therefore analysed the limited guidance avail-
able from DPAs and the case law, and considered its
application in the context of genomic data and open
data sharing. We proposed a three-arm legal test to de-
termine when Article 9(2)(e) can be lawfully invoked.
Our analysis led us to conclude that the exception must
be construed narrowly, even by the general standards of
Article 9(2). Unless each element of the legal test is
met, it would be neither legally nor ethically appropri-
ate to invoke this exception. This does not mean that
Article 9(2)(e) can never be successfully invoked.
Indeed, it may be available in research and non-
research contexts alike, but it does mean that the invo-
cation must be initiated and led throughout the process
by the data subject, rather than the controller or pro-
cessor. Legal certainty in this respect will only become
more important as the EU is planning to establish a
Common European Health Data Space71 and to pro-
mote data altruism72 as part of the European Strategy
for Data. Applying the right set of rules to genome
sharing platforms will be a key step towards building
trust in encouraging data donation for the common
good.
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